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**VIET NAM COLLABORATION IN MANPADS ISSUE**

*(Presented by Viet Nam)*

**SUMMARY**

This paper presents the efforts that have been made by Viet Nam to adhere to ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-11 on the threat of the Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and her collaboration with ICAO Contracting States to resolve this issue.

## **VIET NAM COLLABORATION IN MANPADS**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

1.1 The MANPADS threat against commercial aircrafts has been increased since Momba's incident occurred on 29th November 2002. One of the countermeasures to prevent the threat is to conduct a thorough threat assessment. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has taken into account seriously the MANPADS threat.

1.2 The Resolution A35-11 adopted by the 35th Assembly of ICAO in 2004 stressed the need of the prevention of MANPADS threats against the commercial aircrafts. The APEC Summit in 2004 also promulgated a resolution on a control guideline of MANPADS. Further meetings in APEC led to the decision on the conduct of MANPADS Vulnerability Assessment at one major airport of each member economy.

1.3 The 44th Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation in Asia and Pacific's Action Item number 44/15 urged States enhance coordination and cooperation between the various groupings and bodies in the Region to sustain and encourage regional initiatives for the promotion of safety, security and other civil aviation matters.

1.4 Being the ICAO's Contracting State and APEC economy, Viet Nam has positively responded to the requests on conduct of MANPADS Vulnerability Assessment at Tan Son Nhat International Airport (SGN) at Ho Chi Minh City – a major hub in Southern of Viet Nam where US carriers operating.

### **2. MANPADS VULNERABILITY ASSESSEMENT AT TAN SON NHAT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT**

2.1 The ground vulnerability assessment was conducted from 25 - 29 February 2008 with a joint assessment team consisting of Vietnamese government officials, airport authority, security agencies, and US Transport Security Administration (TSA) experts. The purpose of the assessment is to evaluate the potential threat of launching site (PLS) based on ICAO recommended airport vulnerability assessment technology and US technology.

2.2 The assessment started with a briefing session for assessment team and relevant authorities and continued by site visit and assessment progress. The relevant authorities were reported of assessment activities at the de-briefing

session at the end of the MANPADS assessment.

2.3 The assessment team has defined and evaluated 3 potential launching sites (PLS) based on ICAO recommended airport vulnerability assessment technology. A confidential report was produced by US TSA and furnish to Civil Aviation Administration of Viet Nam (CAAV). Consequently, countermeasures dealing with MANPADS threats have been proposed.

2.4 Viet Nam experts have got a value opportunity to exchange and discuss with TSA experts on the technology of MANPADS vulnerability assessment. These expertises are very useful when Vietnamese experts conduct the MANPADS assessment by themselves at other local airports.

2.5 The cooperation between CAAV and TSA in this issue highlights the cooperative manner between ICAO Contracting States and APEC Member Economies. It is also in line with the ICAO Assembly Resolutions and APEC Summit Declaration on containment and elimination of MANPADS threats against civil aviation.

### **3. MANPADS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT BY VIET NAM**

3.1 Based on the positive results from the joint assessment at SGN, the Government of Viet Nam has developed its owned national wide MANPADS vulnerability assessment.

3.2 The recent ground vulnerability assessment was conducted by a joint assessment team led by CAAV consisting of officials from transportation, public security, national defense ministries and airport authority in 2009 at two local airport located in the Southern of Viet Nam. The assessment has three parts which include pre-assessment process, assessment process and post-assessment process.

3.3 As the result of the assessment, possible threat sites adjacent to the airport perimeter were identified and classified as PLS. A report on the countermeasures dealing with MANPADS threat was prepared and submitted to the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Transport.

3.4 To effectively counter the MANPAD vulnerability, Viet Nam action plan comprised of two levels at the national and local was deployed.

3.5 At the national level, MANPAD vulnerability assessment shall be conducted on the frequent basis at all airports of Viet Nam. All PLS shall be included in the airport contingency plan with clear designation of agency for patrolling the PLS and response to the threat. A mechanism of coordination

between the local airport authorities and operators, local governmental authorities, public security and military forces has been established to counter the MANPADS threat in timely and effectively manner. Documentation of the assessment has been consolidated and used as text book for further training.

3.6 The airport authorities, airport operators and local governmental authority are responsible to propagandize and educate to enhance the security awareness for airport staffs and local residents on suspicious activity at and around PLS sites. Planning and exercising the plan to couter the MANPADS threats shall be conducted on regular basis while the patrolling of military and police forces ensure the early detection of threats.

3.7 Viet Nam would like to welcome the possibility of mutual cooperation among ICAO Contracting States in exchanging the information mitigating MANPADS threats.

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